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Abstract 
Who can wait for larger, delayed rewards rather than smaller, immediate ones? Delay 
discounting measures the rate at which subjective value of an outcome decreases as the length of 
time to obtaining it increases. Previous work has shown that greater delay discounting predicts 
negative academic, social, and health outcomes. Yet little is known about who is likely to engage 
in greater or less delay discounting. Taking a personality perspective, in a large sample (N = 
5888), we found that greater delay discounting was predicted by low Openness and 
Conscientiousness, and higher Extraversion and Neuroticism. Smaller amounts were also 
discounted more than larger amounts; furthermore, amount magnified the effects of Openness 
and Neuroticism on delay discounting. Our findings show that personality is one predictor of 
individual differences in delay discounting—an important implication for intervention 
approaches targeted at delay discounting.  
Key words: Decision Making, Individual Differences, Hierarchical Linear Modeling/Multilevel 
Modeling, Personality, Social Network, Delay Discounting 
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People do not like to wait; thus, more distant rewards—that people have to wait for—
have less subjective value than immediate rewards. Delay discounting is the rate at which the 
subjective value of a reward decreases as the length of time (delay) before it is obtained 
increases. For example, would you rather have $90 now or $100 in a year? $50 now or $100 in a 
year? A higher rate of discounting implies that one is ‘impatient’ and prefers smaller immediate 
rewards rather than waiting for larger rewards at a later time. Such a preference has been 
associated with a range of addictive and impulsive behaviors, including smoking (Krishnan-Sarin 
et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007), drug use (Kirby & Petry, 2004) and obesity (Weller et al., 
2008). In contrast, lower rates of discounting—having a preference for larger rewards in the 
future—have been linked to better academic performance and social functioning, such as social 
relationships and self-control behavior (Kirby, Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005; Mischel, Shoda, 
& Rodriguez, 1989).  
One important mechanism that determines the degree to which people engage in delay 
discounting is the reward size—the ‘magnitude effect’. While some have suggested that degree 
of delay discounting is a constant trait (Odum, 2011), experimental evidence shows that rate of 
discounting varies as a function of amount (Lane et al., 2003). Most studies that tested the 
magnitude effect found individuals discount smaller rewards more steeply than larger ones 
(Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Kirby, 1997; Raineri & 
Rachlin, 1993). In other words, it takes relatively longer for the proportionate subjective value of 
larger rewards to decrease, compared to small rewards.  
While previous work has documented the important practical consequences of individual 
differences in delay discounting, there is a paucity of data exploring in depth who is likely to 
actually engage in greater or less delay discounting. Studies that explored the relationship 
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between age and delay discounting have found contradictory results (Green, Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski, 1999; Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002; Hirsh, Morisano, & Peterson, 2008; Read 
& Read, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2004).  
Studies exploring personality and delay discounting have been limited to main effects and 
usually to certain traits (Becker et al., 2012; Daly, Harmon, & Delaney, 2009; Ostaszewski, 
1996). We take a holistic personality perspective to examine how individual differences in the 
Big Five personality traits are related to delay discounting overall, and, specifically, the 
magnitude of the reward. We focus on two core questions: (a) Are there personality differences 
in propensity to engage in delay discounting? (b) How do personality differences moderate the 
well-established ‘magnitude effect’?  
Personality and Delay Discounting 
The dominant model used in personality research is the Five Factor Model (FFM; Costa 
& McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990). The ‘Big Five’ is composed of the traits (a) Openness to 
Experience (artistic versus conservative), (b) Conscientiousness (self-controlled versus easy-
going), (c) Extraversion (outgoing versus reserved), (d) Agreeableness (compassionate versus 
antagonistic in thoughts and feelings), and (e) Neuroticism (emotionally unstable versus stable).   
Our theoretical analysis suggests that several Big Five personality dimensions should be 
important in explaining individual differences in delay discounting. Specifically, steeper 
discounting rates are operationalized as an indicator of impulsivity (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 
1999; Logue, 1988; Reynolds, 2006) – a construct that has become increasingly important in 
behavioral research. According to Depue and Collins (1999) “impulsivity comprises a 
heterogeneous cluster of lower-order traits that includes terms such as impulsivity, sensation 
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seeking, risk-taking, novelty seeking, boldness, adventuresomeness, boredom susceptibility, 
unreliability, and unorderliness” (p. 495).  
Impulsivity is conceptually related to four domains of the FFM. Costa and McCrae 
(1992) theorised that low self-control is measured by the impulsiveness and self-discipline 
facets, which are part of the Neuroticism and Conscientiousness domains, respectively. 
Impulsive individuals are said to be moody, irritable and excitable, while those low in self-
discipline are lazy, disorganised and lacking meticulousness. The Conscientiousness domain also 
includes a deliberation facet. Individuals low on this facet are hasty, careless and impatient 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). The Extraversion domain includes an excitement seeking facet that 
is similar to venturesomeness (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977) or sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 
1994). Individuals high in excitement seeking are pleasure-seeking, audacious and adventurous. 
Lastly, Soto and John (2009) identified Adventurousness as a facet under the domain of 
Openness to Experience. Individuals high in adventurousness have a preference for novel and 
intense experiences and have had unusual experiences. These characteristics are similar to the 
Excitement-seeking (Costa & McCrae, 1992) or Gregariousness (Soto & John, 2009) facet 
within the Extraversion domain. Thus, we developed four hypotheses: 
1) Individuals high in Neuroticism will engage in steeper delay discounting. 
2) Individuals low in Conscientiousness will engage in steeper delay discounting. 
3) Individuals high in Extraversion will engage in steeper delay discounting (Hirsh, Morisano, 
& Peterson, 2008; Reynolds et al., 2004).  
4) Individuals high in Openness to Experience will engage in steeper delay discounting. 
Agreeableness is characterized by cooperation, empathy and consideration (Thompson, 
2008). We did not see a strong theoretical reason to hypothesize a link between Agreeableness 
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and delay discounting, although those low in Agreeableness may be likely to engage in steeper 
discounting due to their suspicious and skeptical nature. However, we viewed this last hypothesis 
as weak at best. 
Past research addressing personality effects on delay discounting have identified 
important, yet inconsistent, roles played by Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism. 
Daly et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010) found contradictory evidence regarding correlations 
between Conscientiousness and delay discounting. Ostaszewski (1996) found a positive 
relationship between Extraversion and delay discounting, while Hirsh, Morisano & Peterson 
(2008) identified interaction effects between both Neuroticism and Extraversion, and cognitive 
ability on delay discounting. However, these findings are limited in important ways. Much of 
delay discounting research has been conducted on relatively small (n < 150) and homogenous 
student samples (Daly et al., 2009; Hirsh et al., 2010; Hirsh et al., 2008; Ostaszewski, 1996; 
Ostaszewski, 1997). Small samples result in poor statistical power, leading to high risk of 
erroneous findings and low generalizability. In studies with large samples, other methodological 
issues persisted, such as poor psychological measures of personality or delay discounting. For 
example, a study by Rustichini et al. (2012) compared the predictive power of measurements 
derived from decision theory and personality theory in a relatively large sample (N = 1065) of 
American truck drivers. They used the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen & 
Waller, 1992) and mapped its scales on Big Five constructs – but, without empirical evidence of 
its validity.  Further, studies conducted from an economic perspective often fail to be grounded 
in psychological theory or take a holistic personality approach. Thus, we took a psychological 
perspective in a large scale study to provide a more precise test of how personality can explain 
individual differences in delay discounting. 
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Personality as Moderating the ‘Magnitude Effect’ in Delay Discounting 
Previous work has documented the robustness of the ‘magnitude effect’—people are 
comparatively more impatient for low value rewards than rewards of higher value. But whereas 
aggregate differences across groups are well established, nothing is known about individual 
differences in its strength – are some people less or more impatient for small versus large 
rewards? If so, people would respond differentially to delays of larger/smaller amounts – an 
important implication for real-life outcomes. For example, obesity represents a failure to wait for 
small rewards; perhaps it would show a better correlation with delay discounting of small 
rewards.  
Established methods of calculating delay discounting (i.e. hyperbolic discounting; see 
Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Takahashi, Ikeda, & Hasegawa, 2007 for detailed description) 
account for the ratio between the immediate and delayed amount but not the magnitude of the 
delayed amount. Thus, our second aim was to examine how Big Five personality traits 
moderated the relationship between magnitude of the delayed amount and delay discounting. At 
present, no work has examined the role of personality in moderating the impact of amount on 
delay discounting. Studies do show that non-monetary rewards/consumables including food, 
drugs, access to video games etc. are discounted more steeply than money, even among the 
‘normal’ population (Estle et al., 2007; Navarick, 1982; Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; 
Petry, 2001)—possibly pointing to the role of other factors. There are also theoretical reasons to 
expect individual differences in size of the ‘magnitude effect’. For instance, decision by 
sampling theory (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) suggests that individuals change their 
subjective value of rewards according to values they’re used to dealing with in everyday life. 
Personality may also explain individual differences in the ‘magnitude effect’, since it plays a 
9 
 
pervasive role in our responses to daily life situations. However, given the dearth of empirical 
data about mechanisms behind the magnitude effect, we did not formulate specific hypotheses 
about how personality would moderate the effect of magnitude on delay discounting.  
Present Study 
Our study had two aims: First, to test specific hypotheses about how the Big Five 
personality traits explained individual differences in delay discounting; second, to test in an 
exploratory fashion the moderating role of personality on the ‘magnitude effect’. In a large scale 
study (N = 5888), we assessed people’s personalities and discounting behavior for variable 
amounts. Through such a large sample, we were able to detect even subtle effects of personality, 
offering the strongest test to date of the role of personality in delay discounting.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data were collected via the ‘myPersonality’ application on Facebook (Stillwell & 
Kosinski, 2011) between June 2010 and 2011. 9334 international users responded to a 
questionnaire called ‘Today or Tomorrow’ and the 100 item IPIP personality questionnaire 
(Goldberg et al., 2006). All measures were administered in English. From the pool of 9334 
participants who completed the delay discounting measure, subsets of N=5909 for the main 
effects model and N=5888 for the interaction effects model were used in our analyses, based on 
the measures they had responded to. 58 participants were omitted from the final subset (N = 
5888) as they were outliers of 3 SDs above or below the delay discounting mean. It was not 
compulsory to answer all measures, and participants could opt out at any time by exiting the 
application. Of the participants who provided demographic details, 2468 were male (38%) and 
3987 were female (62%), while average age was 23.64 years (SD = 9.06) (see Appendix 1).  
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Before starting, users selected the currency that they were most comfortable using from 
nine currencies (British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Euro, Filipino Peso, Indian Rupee, Indonesian 
Rupiah, Singapore Dollar, South African Rand, United States Dollar). Since the delayed amounts 
were based on previous research using US dollars, Google’s exchange rate function (on 22nd 
June 2010) was used to convert the monetary values to all nine currencies. Users were also told 
that they would not actually receive any monetary rewards at the end of the questionnaire
1
, and 
to assume no inflation when deciding on their responses. 
Delay Discounting Measure 
Seven sets of questions were presented in a randomized order to each participant. 
Participants were asked to repeatedly choose between two hypothetical monetary values – 
various smaller amounts now compared to larger amounts at different points in the future. The 
amounts used as immediate rewards were $1000, $950, $900, $850, $750, $600, $500, $400, 
$250, $150, $100, $60, $20, $10, and $1; while 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year and 
5 years were used as time delays. All these amounts and time delays were compared to $1000 at 
the future time point. An additional set of questions asked participants to choose between 
immediate rewards with amounts one-tenth of those listed above (e.g. $100, $95) and a 1 month 
delay compared to $100 at future time points. We calculated the level of delay discounting as 
parameter k using established methods
2
 (i.e. hyperbolic discounting; see Rachlin, Raineri, & 
Cross, 1991; Takahashi, Ikeda, & Hasegawa, 2007 for a detailed description).  
A hyperbolic function best explains delay discounting in humans because it accounts for 
time inconsistent discounting. This is the switch individuals make from future rewards to 
                                                          
1
 No significant effect of reward type was found in studies comparing hypothetical and real rewards (Johnson & 
Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2004). 
2
 Preliminary analyses showed that a hyperbolic, time inconsistent function fit the data better than an exponential, 
time consistent function. 
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immediate rewards as the relative length of delay decreases (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; 
Takahashi, Ikeda, & Hasegawa, 2007). For example, people are likely to prefer $1000 in 1 year 
and 1 day over $990 in 1 year, but will prefer $990 immediately rather than $1000 tomorrow; 
short delays have a relatively greater impact than longer delays. The hyperbolic delay also fits 
individuals’ discounting data better than the exponential function (Rachlin et al., 1991). The 
hyperbolic function uses the formula: 
V = A / (1 + kD) 
Parameter k refers to the individuals’ estimate of delay discounting (i.e. steepness of the 
curve), A the undiscounted reward amount, D the length of delay, and V the subjective 
discounted value of the reward.  
The highest immediate and lowest delayed monetary values the participant selected were 
averaged to establish a point of inflection (Bickel et al., 1999; Stillwell & Tunney, 2012) and 
then calculate parameter (k). Further, log transformation (to the base 10) was used to normalize 
the data.   
Results 
Data Analysis  
Appendix 1 provides sample demographics by currency used, while Appendix 2 provides 
descriptive statistics and correlations between trait-level (level 2) variables.  
As traditional analysis of variance and multiple regression methods assume independence 
of observations, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques to take into account 
multiple observations from the same user (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The different delayed 
amounts ($100 and $1000) were considered interdependent (level 1) compared to personality 
factors and demographic variables that were measured only once (level 2). Using maximum-
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likelihood estimation, HLM yields independent estimates of the relationships among within-
subject variables (level 1) and models them between-subjects (at level 2) as a random effect 
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Further, all continuous variables were centered (Aiken & West, 
1991) to minimize multicolinearity. The dependent variable, log(k) (i.e. rate of discounting), was 
calculated for each participant at delayed amounts of $100 and $1000. All data were analyzed 
using R statistics with the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012). P-values are not 
available within the lme4 package because there is continued debate about what the appropriate 
degrees of freedom are for a significance test in the multilevel context. However, t-values are 
provided. Given our large sample (main effects model: level 1 N=40,982 and level 2 N=5909; 
interaction effects: level 1 N=11,545 and level 2 N=5,888), we treat t-values which are greater 
than 2 as significant. Furthermore, we provide pseudo R-square as a measure of effect size and 
confidence intervals for all slopes at +/- 2.00*SE levels. It should be noted that moderate t-scores 
(within 2.0 – 7.0 approximately) will invariably have small effect sizes. The large sample size 
should be considered when interpreting statistical findings.  
Delay Discounting and Personality 
Our first goal was to test whether the Big Five personality traits predicted individual 
differences in delay discounting (k). Thus, a hierarchical linear model was constructed as shown 
below (see Appendix 3a. for more details):  
DD = π00 + π10TIME + π20AMOUNT + π01OPENNESS + π02CONSCIENTIOUSNESS + 
π03EXTRAVERSION + π04AGREEABLENESS + π05NEUROTICISM + π06AGE + 
π07GENDER + π08-16CURRENCY + e + u0  
In these analyses, we controlled for currency – to rule out purchasing power parity (PPP) 
as a covariate of delayed reward amount and length of delays – and age and gender to rule out 
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important covariates of personality. However, the effects remained highly similar when these 
covariates were not included. All five personality traits were entered as simultaneous predictors 
to examine their unique effects.  
As Table 1 shows, Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism 
significantly predicted delay discounting. Consistent with our prediction, individuals with greater 
Conscientiousness showed smaller k values—representing less delay discounting. Similarly, 
individuals who were more extraverted and neurotic showed greater delay discounting. On the 
other hand, individuals higher in Openness to Experience engaged in less steep discounting; thus, 
disproving our hypothesis. Agreeableness was unrelated to delay discounting. These findings 
demonstrate that personality differences provide part of the answer to understanding how delay 
discounting rates vary between individuals.  
The effect size estimates (see Table 1) for this model indicate that the magnitude of the 
delayed amount explains approximately 6% (pseudo R-square = 0.056) of the variance in 
discounting rates within each individual. Individual personality factors explain between 0.3 and 
1% of variance (pseudo R-square = 0.003 - 0.01) in discounting behavior between individuals. It 
should be noted that moderate t-scores (within 2.0 – 7.0 approximately) will invariably have 
small effect sizes. The large sample size should be considered when interpreting statistical 
findings.  
 Moderating Role of Personality on the ‘Magnitude Effect’ 
Our second goal in the present paper was to examine whether Big Five personality traits 
moderated the ‘magnitude effect’. The effect size estimates for the main effects model indicate 
that the magnitude of the delayed amount explains approximately 6% of variance in discounting 
rates within individuals, while personality factors explain approximately 1% of variance in 
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discounting behavior between individuals. Considering this still leaves significant variance to be 
explained at the individual and group level, we investigated whether personality factors 
moderated the effect of delayed amount on discounting rates (cross-level interactions). 
To test this hypothesis, we first tested whether our participants showed the ‘magnitude 
effect’. Consistent with past research, participants showed less delay discounting for larger 
amounts, b = -0.15, CI95(-0.16, -0.14), t = -20.51. We next tested whether each of the Big Five 
personality dimensions moderated the effect of amount on delay discounting (see Table 2), such 
as (see Appendix 3b. for more details):  
DD = π00 + π10AMOUNT + π01PERSONALITY + π11AMOUNT*PERSONALITY + π02AGE + 
π03GENDER + π04CURRENCY + e + u0  
  In these analyses (see Table 2), we again controlled for currency, age and gender – and 
again, results were highly similar without these controls. In order to study the magnitude effect 
of delayed amounts, we compared the rate of discounting (log(k) values) with delayed amounts 
of $100 and $1000 at 1 month in the future. We found that Openness and Neuroticism 
dimensions significantly moderated the impact of amount. Specifically, people who are higher in 
Openness tend to discount $100 less than those low in Openness, b = -0.05, CI95(-0.08, -0.02), t 
= -2.95; larger amounts magnify this effect by 60%, with people higher in Openness discounting 
$1000 far less, b = -0.08, CI95(-0.11, -0.05), t = -4.98, than people low in Openness. In the 
opposite direction, individuals high in Neuroticism tend to discount $100, b = 0.05, CI95(0.02, 
0.07), t = 3.95, more than individuals low in Neuroticism. Larger amounts also magnified this 
effect by 60%, with highly neurotic people engaging in even greater discounting of $1000, b = 
0.08, CI95(0.05, 0.10), t = 6.43, than less neurotic people. Thus, for Openness and Neuroticism, 
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greater amounts magnify people’s personality tendency to engage in less (Openness) or more 
(Neuroticism) delay discounting. 
Discussion 
In this study, we took a personality perspective to understand who is more or less likely 
to engage in delay discounting. Partly in accordance with Daly et al. (2009), our findings indicate 
that Conscientiousness and Openness are both negatively related to delay discounting – people 
who are highly conscientious and/or highly open to experience tend to discount future rewards 
less than individuals who are low in either trait. In contrast, we found that Extraversion and 
Neuroticism positively predicted delay discounting, indicating that people who are highly 
extraverted and/or neurotic are less likely to wait for future rewards and more likely to go after 
immediate gains than individuals low in Extraversion and/or Neuroticism. Past research found 
similar relationships between Extraversion and discounting behavior (Hirsh et al., 2010; 
Ostaszewski, 1996; Ostaszewski, 1997). Agreeableness, on the other hand, was unrelated to 
delay discounting – given our large sample, we can conclude there is likely an inappreciable 
relationship between Agreeableness and delay discounting in the general population. While some 
previous studies have looked at certain personality dimensions, studied small, homogenous 
samples, or used less robust measures of personality or delay discounting – we do so (a) in a 
large, diverse sample, (b) using robust psychometric measures and methodology and (c) model 
the direct effects of all Big Five personality dimensions simultaneously.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
In addition to the above main effects, we also examined how Big Five personality traits 
interact with the well-established ‘magnitude effect’— that is, people being more willing to wait 
for larger amounts, while showing steeper discounting for smaller amounts. Interestingly, we 
found that amount to be received in the future acted as a magnifier for the effects of Openness 
16 
 
and Neuroticism. As discussed above, Openness predicted less delay discounting, whereas 
Neuroticism predicted more; however, these effects became even stronger when the delayed 
amount at stake was larger. People highly open to experiences are even more likely to wait for 
future gains if these gains are large as compared to people low in Openness to Experience. In 
stark juxtaposition, people high in Neuroticism were especially likely to not wait for larger gains 
as compared to their low Neuroticism counterparts. Thus, the relationship between Openness to 
Experience and Neuroticism to delay discounting is not simple; rather, it is highly dependent on 
the specific size of the reward one will receive in the future.  
What might explain this pattern of results? As opposed to our initial hypotheses, 
individuals high in Openness in fact engage in less steep discounting than those low in Openness. 
An alternative explanation might be that impulsiveness makes one have insufficient patience to 
explore new ideas or concepts comprehensively; and, hence, less open to experience (Berlin & 
Rolls, 2004). Further, Berlin and Rolls (2004) found that Openness to Experience negatively 
correlated with self-reported impulsivity. This questions whether Openness causes individuals to 
be impulsive or vice-versa. 
 Neuroticism, on the other hand, is characterized by emotional instability and 
impulsiveness. Costa and McCrae (1992) theorised that low self-control is measured by the 
impulsiveness facet of Neuroticism. Those high in Neuroticism may discount the future more 
because they have problems delaying gratification due to poor self-control (Hettema et al., 2006; 
Ostaszewski, 1996). This is magnified when the amounts are larger because the reward is likely 
to be perceived as far more enticing.  
Our findings have several important implications for both the study of delay discounting 
and the interventions predicated on impulsivity and/or delay discounting principles (Chapman, 
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Nelson, & Hier, 1999; Swift & Callahan, 2009). First, our results suggest that individual 
differences in certain aspects of personality determine variations in the discounting function for 
different delayed amounts. In accordance with recent findings, our findings imply different k 
values at different delayed amounts, as opposed to one overall k and delay discounting curve for 
each individual. The interaction between Openness and/or Neuroticism and size of reward 
suggests that certain personality traits may determine individual variation in the delay 
discounting curve. Thus, it appears that the discounting function is more complicated than simple 
[economic] decision making theories assume. Second, understanding the role of different 
personality dimensions in delay discounting can set the stage for the emergence of new 
intervention approaches. For example, the above findings can be used in rehabilitation of patients 
with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Impulsivity is a key characteristic of BPD and 
research shows that it may be linked to deficits in time perception. Patients with BPD may be 
encouraged to be more deliberate in their actions – and are given verbal feedback on doing so – 
as part of their rehabilitation (Berlin & Rolls, 2004). Similarly, intervention methods aimed at 
reducing the lure of small rewards could focus on the Neuroticism trait, teaching individuals to 
control their emotions better. Preferring smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards 
has various implications including failure to save for the future, credit card usage, health-related 
maladaptive behavior such as smoking and overeating.  
Limitations to our study suggest certain future directions. One drawback of our study is 
that we did not have information on the socio-economic status of our participants and, thus, 
could not control for its potential effect. Future work should explain the role SES plays in delay 
discounting, and in particular, how it might affect the personality effects we have identified. 
Another limitation to our study is that we presented participants with only two different delayed 
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amounts ($100 and $1000) and a single delay length. Further research could include a few more 
delayed amounts and/or time delays. Such a study should be conducted carefully as too many 
immediate and delayed amounts can confuse participants and cause them to mix-up immediate 
and delayed values. 
Overall, the current study provides support for individual differences in the delay 
discounting curve. The findings highlight who are likely to engage in such behavior and the 
complexity of the dynamics with relation to the magnitude of the reward being discounted. Some 
individuals show more or less impulsivity/impatience for small delayed amounts than predicted 
by their discounting rate for larger delayed amounts. Personality partly explains the variation in 
delay discounting functions, implying that these differences are not merely the result of random 
noise, but rather a systematic variation related to stable personality traits. Openness and 
Neuroticism strongly moderated the relationship between delayed amounts and discounting rate. 
Based on these findings, there is scope for further research on the dynamics of discounting rates 
between various subsets of the population, such as substance abusers, gamblers and obese 
individuals. 
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Table 1 Main Personality Factors on Delay Discounting (k) 
Predictors b t 
CI95 
Pseudo R-square 
Lower Upper 
Level 1 
     
Delayed amount -0.292 -45.45 -0.304 -0.279 0.056 
Length of delay -0.209 -150.09 -0.211 -0.206 0.392 
Level 2 
     
Openness -0.056 -4.290 -0.081 -0.030 0.003 
Conscientiousness -0.070 -6.690 -0.095 -0.045 0.008 
Extraversion 0.067 7.23 0.049 0.085 0.01 
Agreeableness -0.015 -1.3 -0.038 0.008 0.0001 
Neuroticism 0.070 7.06 0.051 0.090 0.009 
Age -0.001 -1.05 -0.002 0.001 - 
Gender 0.008 0.5 -0.022 0.037 - 
Currency - British Pound 0.015 0.64 -0.031 0.061 - 
Currency - Canadian Dollar -0.134 -3.940 -0.200 -0.067 - 
Currency - Euro 0.023 0.86 -0.030 0.077 - 
Currency - Filipino Peso 0.262 4.54 0.149 0.374 - 
Currency - Indian Rupee 0.201 3.17 0.077 0.325 - 
Currency - Indonesian Rupiah 0.422 4.33 0.231 0.613 - 
Currency - Singapore Dollar 0.103 1.96 0.000 0.206 - 
Currency - South African Rand -0.142 -1.520 -0.324 0.041 - 
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Note. All numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients. The American dollar was used as 
the reference group when creating dummy variables for currency. Age, gender, length of delay 
and currency were entered into the model as control variables. 
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Table 2 Interactions between Amount and Personality Factors on Delay Discounting (k) 
Predictors b t 
CI95  
Lower Upper 
Level 1 predictors 
    
Delayed amount -0.15 -19.6 -0.164 -0.134 
Level 2 predictors 
    
Openness -0.05 -2.95 -0.078 -0.016 
Conscientiousness -0.08 -5.85 -0.1 -0.05 
Extraversion 0.066 5.79 0.044 0.088 
Agreeableness -0.02 -1.09 -0.044 0.013 
Neuroticism 0.048 3.95 0.024 0.072 
Age -0 -0.89 -0.003 0.001 
Gender -0.02 -1.02 -0.056 0.01 
Currency - British Pound 0.027 1.056 -0.024 0.078 
Currency - Canadian Dollar -0.13 -3.35 -0.2 -0.052 
Currency - Euro 0.003 0.083 -0.056 0.062 
Currency - Filipino Peso 0.269 4.245 0.144 0.394 
Currency - Indian Rupee 0.208 2.938 0.069 0.347 
Currency - Indonesian Rupiah 0.411 3.841 0.201 0.621 
Currency - Singapore Dollar 0.16 2.763 0.046 0.274 
Currency - South African Rand -0.18 -1.73 -0.384 0.024 
Level 1 x level 2 interactions 
    
Delayed amount x Openness -0.03 -2.35 -0.059 -0.005 
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Delayed amount x Conscientiousness 0.013 1.18 -0.008 0.034 
Delayed amount x Extraversion 0.012 1.28 -0.007 0.032 
Delayed amount x Agreeableness 0.016 1.3 -0.008 0.04 
Delayed amount x Neuroticism 0.03 2.92 0.01 0.05 
Note. All numbers are unstandardized regression coefficients. The American dollar was used as 
the reference group when creating dummy variables for currency. Age, gender and currency 
were entered into the model as control variables. 
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Figure 1 Delay discounting rates as a function of delayed amount and personality (1 SD 
above/below the mean). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Sample demographics by currency used  
Currency 
Conversion 
per $1 USD 
N (Male/ Female) Mean Age (SD) 
Mean log(k)* 
(SD) 
British Pound 0.68 959 (262/ 408) 25.24 (10.02) -0.93 (0.58) 
Canadian Dollar 1.02 448 (112/ 199) 22.76 (8.99) -1.08(0.59) 
Euro 0.81 666 (222/ 264) 25.6 (8.3) -0.97 (0.57) 
Filipino Peso 45.45 161 (48/ 44) 23.49 (8.02) -0.73 (0.59) 
Indian Rupee 45.65 155 (48/ 30) 23.02 (5.67) -0.75 (0.57) 
Indonesian Rupiah 9009 50 (16/ 15) 23.21 (6.62) -0.55 (0.64) 
Singapore Dollar 1.38 186 (52/ 67) 19.99 (5.46) -0.9 (0.57) 
South African Rand 7.51 64 (14/ 26) 26.61 (8.89) -1.03 (0.52) 
United States Dollar 1 6645 (1694/ 2934) 23.34 (9.08) -0.97 (0.56) 
Note: Conversion per $1 USD based on Google's exchange rate function on 22nd June 2010. 
* Parameter ‘k’ refers to the individuals’ estimate of delay discounting (i.e. steepness of the 
hyperbolic discounting curve). Larger values indicate steeper discounting. i.e. the subjective 
value of a reward in the future decreases immensely. Natural-log transformation was used to 
normalize the data. 
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Appendix 2 Correlations between all level 2 (between-individuals) variables 
 
Variables 
(mean/SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Openness 
(4.041/0.561)   
              2 Conscientiousness 
(3.328/0.721) -.035 
              3 Extraversion 
(3.192/0.838) -.009 
              4 Agreeableness 
(3.482/0.652) -.019 .225 .193 
            5 Neuroticism 
(2.826/0.832) -.001 .109 .148 .217 
           6 Age 
(2.359/0.909) .025 -.069 -.287 -.342 -.332 
          7 Gender .034 .023 .206 .060 .088 -.052
         8 British Pound .012 .016 -.005 .043 .065 .193 .048
        9 Canadian Dollar .002 -.072 -.055 .004 .017 .060 .051 -.004
       10 Euro .015 -.007 -.028 -.021 -.019 .010 -.020 .005 -.074
      11 Filipino Peso -.011 .066 -.023 -.001 -.031 -.029 .062 -.048 -.096 -.062
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12 Indian Rupee .007 -.032 .020 .012 -.017 -.013 -.002 -.035 -.042 -.027 -.035 
    13 Indonesian Rupiah .008 -.004 .000 .005 -.017 -.026 -.004 -.054 -.038 -.024 -.032 -.014
   14 Singapore Dollar -.003 -.026 -.007 -.008 -.013 -.003 -.004 -.022 -.024 -.016 -.020 -.009 -.008
  15 South African Rand -.013 -.049 -.022 -.019 -.040 .017 -.055 -.021 -.047 -.030 -.039 -.017 -.015 -.010
 16 American Dollar .015 .011 .017 .013 .001 -.004 .027 .003 -.026 -.016 -.021 -.009 -.008 -.005 -.010
Note: Please refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics by currency group
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Appendix 3 Explanation of hierarchical linear models constructed during data analyses 
3a. Main effects model 
DD = π00 + π10TIME + π20AMOUNT + π01OPENNESS + π02CONSCIENTIOUSNESS + 
π03EXTRAVERSION + π04AGREEABLENESS + π05NEUROTICISM + π06AGE + 
π07GENDER + π08-16CURRENCY + e + u0  
In this model, π00 is the person’s average delay discounting (DD) when all other factors 
equal zero. In the present study, both level 1 variables have the same average for all participants 
(since all participants received the same scenarios), and thus cannot explain any level 2 variance. 
Furthermore, level 2 variables in the model only account for between-subjects (level 2) variance. 
Thus, the level 2 control variables (age, gender and currency) in the model have no effect on the 
variance explained by AMOUNT and/or TIME.  
π20AMOUNT refers to the difference in DD between delayed amounts of $100 and 
$1000, assuming other level 1 factors (i.e. π10TIME ) are average. π10TIME refers to the change 
in DD for 1 unit increase in TIME assuming AMOUNT = 0 (i.e. $100). Since level 2 continuous 
variables – including personality factors and AGE – were grand-mean centered, π01OPENNESS 
refers to the change in DD for 1 unit increase in OPENNESS, assuming all other level 2 
variables are average. Similarly for π02CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, π03EXTRAVERSION, 
π04AGREEABLENESS, π05NEUROTICISM and π06AGE. π07GENDER is the difference in DD 
between men and women, assuming other level 2 factors are average. Similarly, for each of the 
currency groups (π08-16CURRENCY). Finally, e refers to the residual error within-subjects, while 
u0 refers to the random effect between-subjects.  
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3b. Interaction effects model 
DD = π00 + π10AMOUNT + π01PERSONALITY + π11AMOUNT*PERSONALITY + π02AGE + 
π03GENDER + π04CURRENCY + e + u0  
  Here, π11AMOUNT*PERSONALITY is the change in slope between PERSONALITY 
(i.e. Big 5 traits) and DD for 1 unit increase in AMOUNT, or the change in slope between 
AMOUNT and DD for 1 unit increase in PERSONALITY (i.e. Big 5 traits). 
 
 
 
 
